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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the class of robust models for a mixed strategy Nash equi-
librium of a finite strategic form game $G$ .
The concept of Nash equilibrium has become central in game $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\infty \mathrm{r}\mathrm{y}$, economics
and its related fields. $\mathrm{R}.\mathrm{J}$ . Aumann and A. Brandenburger (1995) gives epistemic
conditions for Nash equilibrium in the model for the modal $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{c}$ S5. However it is
still not yet clear just what classes of models leading to aNash equilibrium in the
epistemic point of view.
The purposes of this paper are two points: First to to introduce agroup structure
on the class of robust models for amixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game
as models for the modal logic $\mathrm{S}4$ , and secondly to characterize the class
$\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ of
the robust models by the clas$\mathrm{s}$ $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ of all the models satisfying with common-
knowledge of conjectures about the other players’ actions. We show:
Main Theorem. The class $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ is a non-empty subclass of $\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ . $R\iota rther-$
more $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ almost coincides with $\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ .
2. Knowledge structure
Let $\Omega$ be anon-empty finite set called a state-space, $N$ aaet of finitely many players
$\{$ 1, 2, $\ldots$ , $i$ , $\ldots$ $n\}$ at least two $(n\geqq 2)$ , and let $\mu$ be a probability measure on
$\Omega$ which
is common for all players. Each member of $2^{\Omega}$ is called an event and each element
of $\Omega$ called a state.
Definition 1. By a knowledge stmcture we mean a pair $\langle\Omega, (K_{i})_{i\in N}\rangle$ , in which
$\Omega$ be anon-empty set called astate-s ace, $K_{i}$ is amapping of
$2^{\Omega}$ into itself
called player $i’ \mathrm{s}$ knowledge operator. Acommon-knowledge structure is aquadruple
$\langle\Omega, (K_{i})_{i\in N}, K_{E}, K_{C}\rangle$ in which $K_{E}$ is the mutual knowledge operator on
$2^{\Omega}$ defined
$\star$ This is an extended abstract and the final form $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathbb{I}$ be published elsewhere
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by $K_{E}E=\mathrm{n}_{:\in N}K_{i}E$. and $K_{C}$ is a common-knowledge operator on $2^{\Omega}$ satisfying
the fixed point property:
$\overline{\mathrm{F}}$P $K_{C}F\subseteq K_{E}(F\cap KcF)$ for every F of $2^{\Omega}$ .
The event $K_{\dot{l}}E$ is interpreted as $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}$ aet of states of nature for which $i$ knows $E$
to $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}$ $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}$ $\dot{\mathrm{a}}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ . The event $K_{E}E$ is interpreted as that dl players know $E$.
The itemted common-knowledge 0I $Kc$ is defined in the folowing way:
Construct the descending chain $\{K^{m}\}$ such that
$K^{0}F:=K_{E}F$; $\overline{K}^{m-1}F:=K_{E}(F\cap K^{m-1}F)$ ;
$K^{m}F:=\overline{K}^{m-1}F\cap K^{m-1}F$.
The operator $Kc$ is given by tlae infifimum of tlae chain:
$K_{C}E=\cap K^{m}Em=0,1,2,\cdots$.
It is plainly observed that $Kc$ satisfies Axiom $\mathrm{F}\mathrm{P}$ . The event $K_{C}E$ is interpreted
as that ‘all players know that all players know that $\ldots$ that dl players knows E.’
Definition 2. A knowledge structure (or a common-knowledge structure) is $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathbb{I}\mathrm{d}$
a $K$ knowledge (or a $K\omega mmon- knowledge$) structuoe if it sah.sfifiaae tlae properties:
For any $E$ , $F\in 2^{\Omega}$ ,
N $K_{\dot{l}}\Omega=\Omega$ and $K_{\dot{1}}\emptyset=\emptyset$ ;
K $K_{i}(E\cap F)=K_{\dot{l}}E\mathrm{n}K_{i}F$ .
It is called a T knowledge (or a T common-knowledge) structure if it satisfies in
addition
T $K_{\dot{l}}(E)\subseteqq E$ for every E $\in 2^{\Omega}$ .
It is called an s4 knowledge (or an s4 common-know&dge) structure if it satisfiae
in additi on
4 $K_{:}(E)\subseteqq K_{\dot{l}}(K:(E))$ for every E $\in 2^{\Omega}$ .
Finally it is called an S4 knowledge (or an s4 common-knowledge) structure if it
satisfies in addition
5 $\Omega\backslash K_{i}E\subseteqq K_{\dot{l}}(\sqrt{l}\backslash K_{\dot{l}}E)$ for every E $\in 2^{\Omega}$ .
3. Associated informtion structure
An infomation stmcture is a $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{r}$ $\langle\Omega, (Q:):\in N\rangle$ in which $\Omega$ is a non empty state-
space and $Q_{:}$ is a mapping on $\Gamma J$ into $2^{\Omega}$ . It is called an $RT$-informaiion structure
if each $Q_{:}$ satisfies the two conditions: For each $\omega$ of $\Omega$ ,
Ref $\omega$ $\in Q:(\omega)$ ;and
Trn $\xi\in Q:(\omega)$ implies $Q_{:}(\xi)\subseteqq Q:(\omega)$ .
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Definition 3. The associated information structure $(P_{i})_{i\in N}$ with aknowledge struc-
ture $\langle\Omega, (K_{i})_{i\in N}\rangle$ is the information structure $\langle\Omega, (P_{i})_{i\in N}\rangle$ defined by $P_{i}(\omega)=$
$\bigcap_{T}\{T\in 2^{\Omega}|\omega\in K_{i}T\}$ .
Remark 1. For each $L=\mathrm{K}$ , $\mathrm{T}$ , $\mathrm{S}4or\mathrm{S}5$ , an $L$ knowledge structure $\langle\Omega, (K_{i})_{i\in N}\rangle$ is
uniquely determined by the associated information structure $\langle\Omega, (P_{i})_{i\in N}\rangle$ as follows:
$K_{i}E=\{\omega\in\Omega |P_{i}(\omega)\subseteqq E\}$ .
Let $K_{i}P_{i}$ : $\Omega$ $arrow 2^{\Omega}$ be the mapping defifined by $K_{i}P_{i}(\omega)=K_{i}(P_{i}(\omega))$ . It is
plainly observed that $(K:P_{i})_{j\in N}$ is an RT-informafion structure for any $L$ knowledge
structure $\langle\Omega, (K_{i})_{j\in N}\rangle$ . It is noted that the associated information structure of an
S4 knowledge structure is an $RT$-information structure, $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{u}\infty$ $K_{i}P_{i}=P_{\dot{l}}$ . Then
$P_{i}(\omega)$ is interpreted as the set of all the states of nature that $i$ knows to be possible
at $\omega$ .
4. Robust models
Let $\Omega$ be anon-empty finite state-s ame and $\mu$ a probability measure on $\Omega$ which
is common for all players. Let $G=\langle N, (A_{i})_{i\in N}, (g_{i})_{i\in N}\rangle$ be a finite $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{c}$ form
game: $A_{i}$ is afinite set of $i’ \mathrm{s}$ actions and $g_{i}$ is $i’ \mathrm{s}$ payoff-function of $A:=\mathrm{x}_{i\in N}A_{i}$ into
R. $i$ ’s overall conjecture $\phi_{i}$ is a probability distribution on $A_{-i}$ . For each player $j$
other than $i$ , this induces the marginal on $j’ \mathrm{s}$ actions called $z’ s$ individual conjecture
about $j$ . Let $\mathrm{a}=$ $(\mathrm{a}_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{a}_{n})$ be a random va1iable of $A$ . If $\mathrm{x}$ is a such function and
$x$ is avalue of it, we denote by $[\mathrm{x}=x]$ (or $\dot{\mathrm{a}}$mply by $[x]$ ) the aaet $\{\omega\in\Omega|\mathrm{x}(\omega)=x\}$ .
Accordingly $P_{i}$ with $\mu$ yields the $i’ \mathrm{s}$ overall conjecture defined by the marginal
$\phi_{i}(a_{-i},\omega)=\mu([\mathrm{a}_{-i}=a_{-i}]|K_{i}P_{i}(\omega))$ viewed as arandom variable of $i’ \mathrm{s}$ conjecture
$\phi_{i}$ . Denote $[ \phi_{i}]=\bigcap_{a_{-:}\in A_{-:}}[\phi_{i}(a_{-i}, \cdot)=\phi(a_{-i})]$ and $[\phi]=\mathrm{n}_{i\in N}[\phi_{i}]$ . We assume heooe
that $[a_{i}]\subseteqq K_{i}([a_{i}])$ for every $a_{i}$ of $A_{i}$ . An player $i$ is said to be rational at $\omega$ if each $i’ \mathrm{s}$
actual action $a_{i}$ maximizes the expectation of his actually played pay-off funch.on $g$:
at $\omega$ when the other players actions are distributed according to his conjecture $\phi_{i}(\omega)$ .
Formally, letting $a_{i}=\mathrm{a}_{i}(\omega)$ , $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}(g_{i}(a_{i}, \mathrm{a}_{-i});\omega)\geqq \mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}(g_{i}(b_{i}, \mathrm{a}_{-i});\omega)$ for every $b_{:}$ in
$A_{i}$ , where $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}$ is defined by $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}(g_{i}(b_{i}, \mathrm{a}_{-i});\omega):=$ $\sum_{a_{-}\dot{.}\in A_{-:}}g_{i}(b_{i}, a_{-i})\phi_{i}(a_{-i},\omega)$ .
Let $R_{i}$ be the set of all the states at which an player $i$ is rational, and denote
$R:= \bigcap_{j\in N}R_{j}$ .
For aprofile of conjectures $\phi=(\phi_{i})_{i\in N}$ , we denote by $\mathrm{B}_{\phi}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ the class of all the
epistemic models $B=\langle\Omega, \mu, (K_{i})_{i\in N}, (\mathrm{a}_{i})_{i\in N}\rangle$ on the game $G$ for the logic $\mathrm{S}4$ , and
denote $\mathrm{B}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)=\bigcup_{\phi\cross\Delta(A_{-i})}\in:\in N\mathrm{B}_{\phi}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$. We call $\mathrm{B}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ the class of all Bayesian
models on $G$ . Let $\mathrm{E}_{\phi}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ be the subclass $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{a}}$sting of all the models $B\in \mathrm{B}^{\mathrm{S}4}(\emptyset G)$
with $K_{C}([\phi])\cap K_{E}R\neq\emptyset$ , and denote $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)=\mathrm{u}_{\phi\cross\Delta(A_{-:})}\in:\in N\mathrm{E}_{\phi}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ , called the
class of models with epistemic conditions for $G$ . Let NE(G) be the set of all mixed
strategy Nash equilibria and let $\sigma=(\sigma_{i})_{i\in N}\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}(G)$ . We set by $\mathrm{R}_{\sigma}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ the class
of all the models $B$ such that there exists a profifile of conjectures $\phi\in \mathrm{x}_{i\in N}\Delta(A_{-i})$
with the property that for every $i,j\in N$, $i\neq j$ and for all $a_{i}\in A:$ , $\phi_{j}(a_{i})=\sigma_{i}(a_{i})$ .
We will call $\mathrm{R}_{\sigma}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ the class of robust models for a Nash equilibrium $\sigma$ of $G$ .
Denote $\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)=\bigcup_{\sigma\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}(G)}\mathrm{R}_{\sigma}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ .
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5. Proof ofMain theorem
For the first part that $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)\subset \mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ :It can be plainly observed that for
$\sigma\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}(G)$ , $\mathrm{E}_{\sigma}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)\neq\emptyset$ and so $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)\neq\emptyset$ . Let $B=\langle\Omega,\mu, (K_{i}):\in N, (\mathrm{a}:):\in N\rangle\in$
$\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ and $B\in \mathrm{E}_{\phi^{4}}(G)$ . Take $\omega\in K_{C}([\phi])\cap K_{E}R$. Set $\sigma:(a:):=\phi_{j}(a:)$ with $j\neq i$
and $\sigma=(\sigma:):\in N$ . We can observe that for every $a \in\prod_{:\in N}$ Supp(\sigma :), $\phi_{:}(a_{-\dot{l}})=$
$\sigma_{1}(a_{1})\cdots$ $\sigma:-1(a:-1)\sigma:+1(a:+1)\cdots$ $\sigma_{\hslash}(a_{n})$ , and thus $\mathrm{v}\mathfrak{s}\mathrm{e}$ obtai$\cdot$ that each ach.on $a$:apIaearing with posih.ve probability in $\sigma$: at $\omega$ maximizes $g$: against $\phi_{:}(a_{-\dot{1}})$ . This
implies that $’=(\sigma:):\in N\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}(G)$ , and so $B\in \mathrm{R}_{\sigma}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ .
For tlae aecond part: We can introduce tlae ooerah.on $\oplus:\mathrm{B}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)\mathrm{x}\mathrm{B}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)arrow$
$\mathrm{B}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ such that tlae $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\Gamma 1\mathfrak{X}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}$ $\langle \mathrm{B}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G), \oplus\rangle$ is an abelian aaemigroup. Now we can
explicitly state the second part of the main theorem as follows:
$\mathfrak{M}\infty \mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}$ 1. Let the notation be the same as above. Then the following statementsare true:
(i) Both stmctures $\langle \mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G),\oplus\rangle$ and $\langle \mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G),\oplus\rangle$ $aoe$ sub-semigmups of $\langle \mathrm{B}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G),\oplus\rangle$ .
$R\iota \mathcal{M}emore$, $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ is a sub-semigroup of $\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ .
(ii) The quotient gmup $\mathcal{G}(\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G))$ of $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ is isomorphic to the quotimt group
$\mathcal{G}(\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G))$ of $\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ .
Proof. For (i): It is easy to oeri $\theta$ $(\mathrm{i})$ . For (ii): First we note that the cancellation law
holds in tlae abelian semigroups $\langle \mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G), \oplus\rangle$ and $\langle \mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G), \oplus\rangle \mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}_{1}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{h}.\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}1\mathrm{y}$. This
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\infty$ that the quoh. $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ groups $\mathcal{G}(\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G))$ and $\mathcal{G}(\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G))$ of $\langle \mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G),\oplus\rangle$ and
$\langle \mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G),\oplus\rangle$ ooespech.vely are constructed, and it can $k$ verifified that $\mathcal{G}(\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G))\cong$
$\mathcal{G}(\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G))$ .
6. Concluding remarks
1. A model $B$ for the $\mathrm{S}4\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{c}$ is called a model for tlae logic S5 provided that for
any $E\in 2^{\Omega}$ ,
5 $\Omega\backslash K_{\dot{l}}E\subseteqq K_{\dot{l}}(\Omega\backslash K_{\dot{l}}E)$.
Or equivalently, the associated infomation structure $(P_{\dot{1}}):\in N$ maks an infor-mation partition; that is, for each $\omega\in\Omega$ ,
$\mathrm{S}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{m}$ $\xi\in P_{\dot{1}}(\omega)$ impliaae $P_{\dot{l}}(\xi)=P_{\dot{1}}(\omega)$ .
In view of $\mathrm{R}.\mathrm{J}$ . Aumam and A. Brandenburger (1995) it can be sbwn that
$\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{S}5}(G)\subseteqq \mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{S}4}(G)$ in tffi models for the logjc S5.
2. Ehrtkrmoooe, tlae main theoooem is sh.ll true in tlae class ofmodels for each modal
logics $\mathrm{K}$ , $\mathrm{K}\mathrm{T}$ , $\mathrm{S}4=\mathrm{K}\mathrm{T}4$ and S5 $=\mathrm{K}\mathrm{T}45$ .
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